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**RECONSTITUTION:
A WEAK LINK IN U.S. SECURITY**

BY

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
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The National Security Strategy has identified four elements critical to the future security of the country: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The purpose of this study is to focus on reconstitution which, in light of current and projected defense cuts, is vitally important in the event the nation must again face a global challenger. Unfortunately, over the long run, reconstitution is unlikely to be able to provide sufficient capabilities, within the timeframes promised, in order to either deter or defend; time is the issue. The reasons for this are two-fold: First, reconstitution bets on the availability of early warning followed by decisive political action, well in advance of any potential conflict. This assumption is necessary to provide the long leadtimes--literally years--required to produce modern high tech weapons of war. The problem is this assumption has no historical credibility; America has, politically, never been able or willing to prepare for war during peace. The United States' late entries into World Wars I and II were not flukes, since the political and economic structure of the country makes it difficult, if not impossible, to do otherwise, in the absence of direct enemy attacks. Second, reconstitution promises a robust industrial base with the capability to quickly produce and sustain large scale operations. Yet, even now, this base is fragmenting as thousands of contractors and subcontractors flee the defense business, if they haven't already failed. Motivated by profits, those who survive--including primary contractors--will be rescaled, retooled and redirected towards other, nondefense related, growth opportunities. The defense department does not have the dollars, nor does the nation have the will, to stop this flight. Government ownership or strict regulation of the means of production is not the answer either, as this would likely kill healthy competition. Lacking the strategic depth once provided by America's two great ocean barriers, other--more realistic--strategies are clearly called for. This paper provides several revised assumptions and recommendations for consideration. Recognizing the significantly constrained fiscal realities facing defense and the nation, America's future standing forces--active and reserve--must remain high quality, in terms of people and equipment.

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RECONSTITUTION: A WEAK LINK IN U.S. SECURITY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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RECONSTITUTION A WEAK LINK IN U.S. SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Over the past 75 years, the United States followed its victories in two world wars by quickly dismantling the great armed forces that had won them...appeared to tell the world that Americans were not willing to defend their interests...invited hostile powers to test our will. In each case we were to pay the price in future conflicts.

George Marshall...As Army Chief of Staff from 1939-45, it was his job to build a weak, unprepared American Army into a force capable of victory in global war...In the aftermath Marshall reflected:

"We may elect again to depend on others and the whim and error of potential enemies, but if we do we will be carrying the treasure and freedom of this great nation in a paper bag."¹

When President Bush laid out his vision of a new national security strategy in Aspen, on 2 August 1990, he noted that while the world had indeed changed, it nevertheless remained a dangerous place. As the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was proving, regional threats were not only likely, but could arise quickly from unexpected quarters. The president insisted the United States must retain sufficient strength to protect its continuing interests. In this regard, he identified four elements as essential to the nation's future security posture: Strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.²

This study focuses on reconstitution, which in light of current and projected defense cuts, will become ever more critical to the nation's future security posture. Present

economic and threat considerations certainly warrant change, but how far should the reductions go without a clear vision of future possibilities? Responsible individuals cannot simply shrug off the likelihood of future global military challenges without casting a blind eye toward history, human nature, and the increasing chaos of today's world.

Reconstitution is intended to cope with future uncertainty. It speaks to the vital need for the nation to maintain a robust capability to rearm itself--a latent base capability from which to generate completely new military forces--in the event a global threat is detected. Not a new concept, reconstitution is the traditional American way of preparing for and waging war--done several times already this century. Known before as national mobilization, "...it is the basic factor on which depends the successful prosecution of any war."³ Today's promise is that reconstitution will provide a capability to either deter or, if necessary, defend before an opponent can muster an "overwhelming offense."⁴

Unfortunately, the United States has no history of military preparedness in the absence of a major threat; even now the country appears to be again turning inward and stacking arms. As such, the cold war is likely to remain the only recent instance where the country had sufficient motivation to get the deterrence piece right. Without a threat Americans typically lose interest in world affairs conveying an unwillingness to act and forfeiting their credibility--the heart and soul of deterrence.

Luckily, in the past, the nation always had time to build its strength because of the protective barriers afforded by two great oceans. Largely self sufficient, possessing an ample supply of both natural and human resources, together with a robust industrial base, the American 'arsenal of democracy' depended on few others for input. Times have changed, however, and it is unlikely that the United States can count on such advantages in the Twenty-first Century.

Simply put, it is improbable that America will be able to reconstitute its armed forces *in time* to either deter or defend in the next century. The reasons for this are developed in Part I; hinging on sufficient lead-time being made available in order to prepare for battle, reconstitution assumes receipt, acceptance and decisive political reaction to early warning--a feat the U.S. has never accomplished. The causes, largely political and structural, remain relevant today.

Additionally, the strategy promises immediately responsive industrial base capabilities from which to draw modern weapons. Even with early warning, however, the risks are extraordinary as the industrial base, challenged by stiff foreign competition and significantly declining U.S. defense budgets, is fragmenting even now. The resulting smaller, less active, base will increase leadtime requirements making timely reconstitution unlikely.

In Part II, several assumptions and recommendations are provided. Three warrant particular emphasis here:

First, the reconstitution notion requires serious

modification as its promises of early action and timely production are simply not credible; it risks seriously misleading the nation with regard to future defense capabilities and gets in the way of new thinking. New security solutions that do not rely on early warning or early political decisions must be fashioned and carried out now, within available resources.

Second, and related, the leadership of the nation--the president, Congress, Defense and other executive departments--as well as private industry must look deeper into the future in devising new security forces. National security objectives and policies must be set based on long term national interests not short term budgetary considerations. Global threats, unknowable at present, will be there; to assume otherwise is to bet against history, especially 20th Century history. Unity of effort--jointness--will be vital if new ground is to be broken.

Finally, Americans should be reluctant to accept instant answers and skeptical of those who promise complete solutions now. Present problems are too complex and the transitions currently taking place in the world may go on for generations. Vigilance, persistence and patience are virtues required in abundance, especially, if the nation is to avoid being lulled to sleep. America ought not approach the next century, as General Marshall once advised, carrying "the treasure and freedom of this great nation in a paper bag."

PART I

ASSESSMENT - WHAT IS REALISTIC AND WHAT IS NOT?

A Nation of Short Memories and High Hopes:

People have forgotten today what a difficult time we had raising an army, how bitter was the opposition to raising it, how strong was the influence of the Middle West. When we began to get the army in some size in 1941, it almost dissolved and [was] only saved by one vote. I find many intelligent men today that don't recall that at all. Yet, that was a historic, almost a fatal point in our military history of the war.⁵

General George C. Marshall

As Marshall reflected, a draft and reserve call-up limited to one year, unless the president ordered otherwise, had been initiated the previous autumn and was due to expire shortly. The loss of that single year's worth of individual and unit experience would have virtually wiped out the meager beginnings of America's preparations for war--a war many optimistic people still hoped to avoid--scarcely five months before Pearl Harbor. Getting only grudging support from the president for his early mobilization efforts, the general found himself, in late July, struggling with Congress to retain what little he had gained.⁶

It is important to note this national reluctance to take up arms was not due to a lack of warning, but to an inability to act on the warnings provided. This suggests a far deeper national character trait that must be taken seriously, especially, as it remains alive and well today. Not only Marshall but the president and a significant number of Congress could, and did, read the winds of war equally well. Characteristically, that did not ease their dilemma:

"No one had to tell me how much it [mobilization] was needed. I knew that years before. But the great question was how to get it....We had regard for the fact that the president didn't feel assured he could get the backing of the people generally, and the Middle West in particular. ...People have forgotten the hostility of that time. Life magazine played it up at great length, the OHIO movement (Over the Hill In October)....Certain phases of democracy make it quite a struggle to raise an army..."⁷

Leaders must question, today, whether current strategies reflect past realities--realities which have changed little if at all? This was not the first time America hesitated to arm herself, to prepare for war in the face of a clear and present danger, nor was it the last. In fact, many of the same old problems were evident even as Iraq invaded Kuwait, in August 1990. Concerning the future, then, what assumptions should be made? Is it wise to assume future rearmament will be any easier than in the past? To find answers one must examine the promise.

Reconstitution - A Definition:

As defined in the National Security Strategy of the United States, reconstitution at the national strategic level speaks to the nation's ability to generate wholly new forces in expectation of a global war. These are new forces and new capabilities required beyond those that may be on hand, in the total force structure, at the time needed.

Accordingly, reconstitution involves a myriad of separate yet related activities: research, engineering, and manufacturing as well as organizing, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, and deploying major new forces--air, ground, sea, and space.

In answering the question, what is realistic and what is

not, three key precepts inherent to the definition of reconstitution must be addressed:

First, this strategy presumes the possibility that the nation may one day face another global threat--some power more threatening than the regional contingencies currently recognized. More will be said on this in a moment.

Second, reconstitution presumes the availability of sufficient warning, and therefore sufficient preparation time, in order to ensure the completion of all actions necessary to either deter or, if necessary, defend before an opponent can muster an "overwhelming offense."⁸ Herein lies the rub; can the nation ignore Marshall's historical dilemma where leaders may know full well what needs to be done, but cannot resolve, politically, how to go about it?

Third, the strategy expects the industrial base to rapidly gear up for mass production, possibly from a cold start, while continuing to provide scientific and technological dominance.⁹ Is this capability likely to be available fifteen, twenty or more years from now, if, as current trends suggest, more and more of the base is likely to be either dismantled or shut down with each passing moment? How quickly can this capability be brought to bear, decisively, on a field of battle?

A Global Threat:

With the defeat of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the primary threat which occupied the mind and pocket-book of the United States, for the last fifty years, disappeared.

With that disappearance, and driven by economic necessity, it makes sense to downsize the massive conventional and nuclear forces that made victory possible. The question is, however, whether the nation can again stack arms on the presumption that the Soviets were the final challenge? Many voices today, including those who should know better, suggest that it was.

It seems reasonable, at present, to regard America as the only full service superpower in the world. No others--Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain, or Russia--retain the depth of political, economic and military power of the United States. Nor are there any on the horizon who seem capable of challenging America any time soon. Consequently, there is a rising chorus of citizens who dismiss the possibility of future global threats to the nation. The perceived U.S. technological edge in military hardware is cited as the basis for numerous propositions that there will be no other challengers. There is a tendency to regard technology as both savior and Satan, as the ultimate source of solutions and the only source of threats. Can the nation really hide behind such a notion, however? Is technology likely to be either the ultimate solution or the ultimate threat?

History is replete with the continual rise and fall of new empires. While new technologies may have been important in part, they were not the only reasons, or even the main reasons, for past successes or failures. Ghengis Khan and the Mongol hordes did not possess any singular technologies markedly superior to the opponents they faced a thousand years ago. Instead, their

indomitable spirit combined with superior organizational, administrative, and fighting skills--their methods of waging war and ruling--allowed them to prevail. They ruled from horseback, yet controlled territories ranging from Korea to Eastern Europe, and from Russia, to Persia, India and even Java. Nor was the rise of the Ottoman Empire that followed the Mongol's, or the British Empire of the 18th and 19th centuries, the single result of new and vastly superior technologies.

In more recent times, Germany's challenges to world order, in World War II, were not due to new inventions that they alone possessed. The internal combustion engine, the tank and the airplane had been around for years. What was new, however, was the way the German Army used these weapons--in combination and in mass--ways the allies had only toyed with. Who, in 1933, expected this ragtag nation decimated by the previous war, rampant with inflation and unemployment, and staggering under the weight of reparations payments to become a global challenger only a few short years later? And, who acted on the warnings even when the threat became obvious? Technology, then, has not always been the final arbiter of superiority.

Only recently, at the end of World War II and during the cold war, has technology assumed a premier role. Yet even now this is more often the result of fear and skewed perceptions, than actual capabilities. In 1945, the Soviet Union lay largely in ruins, victorious to be sure, but having suffered the destruction of millions of her citizens and a large portion of

the national infrastructure. Only four short years later, however, the USSR became a global threat to the surprised West with a relatively limited atomic capability--a capability that, in hindsight, was overrated at the time. The world was surprised still again when the Soviets launched Sputnik--and fears again outraced reality. Finally, the ultimate surprise of all, the total collapse of the evil empire in 1991, was neither caused nor prevented by technology. The collapse had been coming for years from within but the West did not see it because of its single minded preoccupation with the threat of Russian technology.

In the wake of the Soviet's collapse, America must realize technology is not the only answer to power, nor is it likely to be the only threat facing the nation. The events of the past three years, ranging from the previously unpredicted war in the Gulf in 1990, to the Soviet collapse in 1991, to more recent actions in Bosnia, Somalia, Bangladesh and Liberia (to name but a few) suggest the world is as unpredictable, and as violent, as ever--perhaps more so. Future global threats are likely and must be considered. The problem will be to remain alert to all possibilities, discounting nothing either due to ignorance or arrogance. Ghengis Khan's decendents are out there somewhere, watching and waiting, and, in the face of current cutbacks, the nation's ability to rearm itself quickly will become crucial.

Early Warning and Preparation--Historical Perspectives:

Time is the issue; it makes no sense to worry about rearming if the country cannot do it in time to either deter or defend.

As noted earlier, reconstitution assumes both early detection and decisive reactions to global threats. Is this realistic, however, considering the U.S. has never adequately mobilized for war before the outbreak of hostilities? Future success demands that past problems be recognized and dealt with intelligently--up front. The study of past manpower (term includes women) issues, for example, provides good insight to potential reconstitution difficulties and indicates pitfalls to the early warning assumption.

Manpower is probably the single resource that the U.S. has most readily available at its finger tips and has always been present in sufficient quantity and quality: young, fit and, therefore, eligible.

Yet, in analyzing World War I, Millis notes, "After the 'token' dispatch of the 1st Division to Europe, beginning in May 1917, many long months were to elapse before any further combat ready troops were to become available."¹⁰ The political decisions necessary to mobilize were made late, delaying the necessary organization, training, and deployment of forces, all of which takes considerable time. Marshall also remembered the lesson well--indeed he had been among the first troops to arrive in France--and thus his vigorous efforts, as the Army chief from 1939 on, to avoid repeating history prior to U.S. entry into the Second World War.

In treating manpower specifically, the United States Army Center for Military History (CMH) concludes that up through the

end of World War II, *"It can still be said that the United States has never adequately and fully planned for a mobilization before it occurred."* (CMH's italics)¹¹ Nor, in the absence of a plan, has the U.S. ever executed mobilization in advance of a war.

In June 1950, when the North Koreans invaded the south they were acting on the presumption that the U.S. would not respond. They were wrong, of course, but it was not only the North Koreans who were surprised.

To its dismay, the United States learned in those first few months of conflict, scarcely five years after victory in World War II, American forces were not fit for battle. Only at the price of a tremendous human sacrifice was complete disaster avoided. So much so that the Army's present Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, repeatedly uses Task Force Smith--the ill equipped and ill prepared force first thrust into the jaws of the attacking North Koreans--as an example of American unpreparedness at its worst. That initial lack of readiness cost the nation dearly, and proved that even a world superpower cannot go to war, if it's not ready, without severe consequences. Can material mobilization, or reconstitution, be any easier than manpower?

Material production is invariably more complex to generate, involving as it does the creation or manufacture of things that do not exist. For military hardware, the problem may be further exacerbated depending on where an item is in its life cycle--research, development, testing or procurement.

Factor in problems with the availability of all sorts of raw materials, skilled labor (which may be competing with military manpower during mobilization), scientific, engineering, or management expertise, production technologies, plant and equipment--to name but a few resourcing problems--and the complexity obviously grows.

Finally, add the dilemma of a society where the government owns relatively few of the actual means of production, and therefore lacks direct control, and where defense goals do not necessarily coincide with other domestic issues or private shareholder concerns.

It should come as no surprise then, the American materiel mobilization record preceding all previous major conflicts lags well behind manpower. At best, past war production efforts can only be described as providing all of the highs, lows and thrills of a roller coaster ride, straining to go up only with the actual onset of hostilities, cresting the rise somewhere well after the battle is joined, and crashing down immediately after peace breaks out. While it would perhaps be more desirable to smooth the peaks and valleys, or at least provide for a more even ramp up and down, the American political system has never allowed it.

For instance, World War I production, to all intents and purposes, never happened. The U.S. "legislative products came too late to have any substantial impact on American military readiness..." and should have shown, once and for all, when time is of the essence no amount of money will help.¹² Though the

United States eventually joined the Allies in battle, its forces were equipped largely by the Europeans. The foreign war supplies included everything from airplanes, artillery, and small arms (British Enfield's) to ammunition. "Weapons, even though much simpler in those days than they were later to become, could not be conjured up as easily as men."¹³

In World War II, the American 'Arsenal of Democracy' was credited in large measure for shoring up the allies and eventually insuring victory. Still, the victory was not the result of early action that might have provided either deterrence or defense before Europe was lost and Australia brought to the brink of invasion. The U.S. entry came only well after others were dangerously near collapse and, yet again, a blood sacrifice was demanded and paid because of initial hesitations.

Yet in the sultry summer of 1939 the most casual observer could almost feel the Second War approaching, with all the majestic tragedy of the inevitable...The tension was reaching a palpable breaking point; and in the crisis of late August and September it broke...On September 8, 1939 President Roosevelt proclaimed a "limited national emergency"...used it to authorize immediate increases in the armed forces. Yet the scale was still tiny...It may be said that it took the United States about two years, from September 1939 to December 1941, to lay the foundations of a military structure...to begin upon the productive capacity required to sustain it.¹⁴

It was to take another year before U.S. forces could begin to take to the field with forces of any size (Guadalcanal in August 1942, and North Africa in November). Even then, it required still another year before the decisive influence of American production and forces began to have an effect on the "hopes and calculations of the enemy."¹⁵ From a historical

perspective , then, the prospect of early reconstitution is dubious, at best.

Commenting on the cyclic nature of war materials production, Tomlinson notes, "Historically we have been consistent--consistently episodic."¹⁶ Jacques Gansler, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Material Acquisition, notes that over the past 200 years, eight features characterized U.S. reconstitution capabilities. Five of these included the extreme cyclic nature of defense procurement, lack of structural planning, inadequacy of preparedness planning, lack of actual readiness, and the importance of technology and research.¹⁷

From the perspective of America's most recent wars, time must remain an issue--a promise of early warning is simply not credible. Invariably one must ask why?

Fallacy of the Early Warning Assumption:

With respect to warning time, the most critical and elusive factor in operational planning....there are some things...that we can be sure about. First, to guess wrong when dealing with a powerful adversary is to lose. Second, warning time isn't warning time unless you exploit it; otherwise it is wasted time.¹⁸

While there may be several reasons for possible early warning failures, two stand out and deserve highlighting: First, there is the problem of faulty intelligence either because of collection and analysis difficulties, or, even more likely, because the leadership fails to correctly respond to good estimates when received. Second, and as Marshall alluded to, the problems presented by the democratic process may present obstacles to timely responses--especially if costs are likely to

be significant. The consequence, in either case, is delay and wasted time.

Intelligence: Little has changed over the years. In virtually every conflict--of which the Gulf War is only the most recent example--there seems to be an American penchant for letting the other guy draw his gun first. Typically, in hindsight, it becomes apparent that warning indicators regarding the opposition's capabilities and dispositions were generally available all along. Why, then, has the U.S. response so often been so late and ill prepared? Is it enough to be able to assess enemy capabilities?

Many current authors point out that the most difficult piece of analysis, the one which stands the least chance of being resolved, has to do with figuring out an opponent's intentions (literally mind-reading):

Surprises in the foreign political field arise, in reality, from difficulties of comprehension. These may be formidable whenever one is dealing with authoritarian leaders subject to sudden impulses and liable to inconsistency....The greatest difficulties in political analysis usually concern the intentions of new regimes which have emerged as a result of radical internal change....will be the central issue facing the West in the near future.¹⁹

Without a doubt, the present leadership in Iraq fits this mold. Just as certain, an incredible--and increasing--number of others fit the mold as well, making it especially unlikely that it will be any easier to clarify threats in the tumultuous post-cold war era than it has ever been. Further, as Professor Michael Handel points out, "political and military intentions...are much easier to conceal"²⁰ as opposed to an adversary's capabilities, and may

inspire action when least expected. He concludes,

...it seems more prudent to emphasize the study of intentions for the following reasons...(A) An adversary can still decide to attack even though his capabilities are relatively weak....(B) War and surprise attack are determined not by the existence of capabilities per se, but by the political intention to use them. The mere possession of superior, equal, or inferior strength is therefore less important. Since it is, of course, much easier to obtain information on capabilities than intentions, the temptation to concentrate on that which is simpler to identify or measure must be consciously resisted.²¹

The problem for reconstitution is such that an opponent who can hide his intentions probably can delay outside interference indefinitely. Saddam Hussein goofed, in August 1990, by straddling the Saudi/Kuwaiti border directly and with far more force than was necessary at the time, thereby threatening world oil supplies directly. It was only then that the U.S., Saudi Arabia and the rest of the world finally agreed upon Iraq's evil intent and acted. As a result a coalition was born and the use of force became justifiable to the American people and to the world at large. Alternatively, and even with Kuwait already in hand, had Saddam simply retrograded his combat forces somewhat, perhaps sitting in the Rumayla oil fields, or had he only occupied the Warba or Bubiyan Islands, the allies might never have banded together.²²

The prospects for making more accurate assessments of intent in the future are not good. The rapidity of political, national and social changes in the world today, many through violent internal upheavals, makes it more difficult to predict not only who will be in power tonight, but what their intentions may be.²³

Further, setting considerations of intent aside, the increasing rate of technological change is similarly increasing the chances for strategic surprise. In this instance, one cannot regard the Russians as the only potential source of future threats. "In the twentieth century, technological surprise has become one of the most formidable forms of surprise in war,"²⁴ and it's not just new weapons but novel ways of using older ones that can cause difficulties. While the U.S. has long assumed technological dominance in the world, there have been substantial and continuing inroads by others: Japan, Germany, France, Britain, and, in the not so distant past Russia. Nor is technology beyond the grasp of China or such rebel nations as the North Koreans, the Irans, or the Libyas of the world.

Americans cannot arrogantly assume that others will not outdistance them at some point. In the modern world there is an overabundance of noise; sorting it out, analyzing it and using the right information at the right time is tougher today than at any time in the last fifty years. The assumption the nation will have sufficient warning and use it perfectly--or at least quickly--is not something to hinge a plan upon. The national political processes will not make the job of deciding and acting any easier, either.

The Democratic Process: The second, and possibly tougher, component of the early warning fallacy is the political decision making process of the United States. Marshall, reminiscing in 1957 reflected,

It would be very difficult for a democracy to avoid some degree of unpreparedness such as we had in 1939. We had almost no preparedness then. I would say the greatest service we have been rendered has been by Molotov and Vishinsky, because they have kept the Congress so stirred up...if they had subsided, there is no doubt in my mind at all our appropriations would have subsided in a very large measure....The taxpayer is going to dominate and the political action is going to follow. And as soon as it appears quieted down, all the appropriations are going to begin to lapse. It has happened and it's happened, and it will happen again.²⁵

Can America avoid the unpreparedness that has plagued the nation in the past? The reconstitution strategy assumes that it can, yet none of the nation's basic methods have changed. For decisive action the strategy must rely on the same economic and political processes that have consistently failed in the past, while the decisions themselves have only become inherently more complex and, possibly, lethal. Time is more important than ever as the strategic depth available to the nation shrinks.

In short, unless the framework of the government is changed, bypassed or ignored (which is not recommended) it is a constant. Mobilization decisions must be made within the strictures provided in the Constitution and security planning must assume lengthy delays as a consequence. Several points are important and must be recognized in this regard:

First, the nature of the decision: Typically, decisions regarding the reconstitution of significant armed forces involve vague situations where information, as noted previously, may either be lacking, incomplete, contradictory, ignored, or simply misread. In these cases decisive U.S. political reactions are not likely to follow.

In the case of Iraq, for example, it was Saddam Hussein's intentions, more than his capabilities and dispositions, which remained a mystery to U.S. and other world leaders throughout the spring and summer of 1990. Just as mysterious, even up to the point of the invasion of Kuwait, was whether the Saudi's would ever allow the west into the region, or whether the U.S. could even garner the support of other world economic powers.

Friends, then, as well as adversaries are part of the kaleidoscope of variables that must be considered. Add in the variety of possible options, political, economic or military, together with all of their 'assumed' second and third order effects, and one might begin to appreciate the complexity of the decision maker's dilemma.

Finally, factor in strong popular emotional reactions or sympathies, especially, as anticipated financial and human costs are calculated and advertised. The conclusion must be, without a strong early mandate by the people, or without vigorous presidential molding of public and Congressional attitudes, there exists little possibility of early or decisive actions without direct attacks on the nation. Decisions based on vague, incomplete, emotional or conflicting information will be tough to make, and timeliness must suffer. To broadly promise, therefore, early detection, early decisions, and early action--years in advance of a potential fight--is not realistic.

Second, the economics of the decision: To borrow from macro economics, should we spend our scarce resources procuring guns or

butter? The nation cannot afford all it wants of both and, consequently, must make a choice.

Traditionally, in times of relative peace--absent a global threat--the political economic decisions have always tended to favor the butter side of the equation. Costly weapon systems and large standing forces remain unjustifiable to the general population and, expectedly, are abandoned in favor of more immediate, closer, concerns. This tendency remains a central cause of America's past difficulties in preparing for war and has not changed.

The implications for reconstitution are important and direct as the tradeoffs required cannot be reduced to purely military or foreign policy terms. Major economic costs have major political impacts, and, Constitutionally at least, debate and a good deal of compromise are essential to the final solutions. Congress, as the representative body of the people, must be involved, and the prospects for early decisive actions diminish as a result.

Third, a government of compromise: The Constitutional authority to mobilize for war has always belonged to the president and to Congress jointly. It is by design a shared decision process, and is fraught with all of the tensions which exist between the different branches of government because of their separate and distinct powers. Presidents and Congress can deny that they are playing politics when it comes to national security, but, while it may be true that they are not acting whimsically or selfishly, it also remains true that they have no

choice but to deal with each other politically and compromise. Such activities are inherent to the political and budget processes which provide the resources and authority necessary to arm the nation. This conclusion contains several implications for mobilization:

A weakened presidency: Unless the rules are changed, or unless future presidents are altogether superior to the men who have previously held the office, presidents cannot be expected to provide timely decisions of the sort required by reconstitution. This is not to cast negative aspersions on any of the past, present or future Commanders in Chief, but rather to recognize the seriousness of the many forces which tug and pull at the holder of this office. Given the shared power arrangement of the Constitution, the institution of the presidency can only be viewed as having been weakened substantially from what is possible under either an authoritarian or, even, a parliamentary system.

As a consequence, presidents rarely act alone even if they may want to and think they have the legal authority to do so. Even a president as popular and decisive as Roosevelt, Marshall noted, could not find the political support, and therefore confidence, to mobilize prior to Pearl Harbor. America's isolationist mood limited the President's actions:

The Neutrality Act of 1937 represented the high point of this mood, in which war was regarded rather as a disease...In a celebrated speech...in October 1937 President Roosevelt sought to turn the medical metaphor in the opposite direction. "The epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading"; he suggested that it was the infected nations

which should be placed "in quarantine," rather than that the United States should seek to quarantine itself against them. But this hint of forceful action received a "bad press," and Roosevelt more or less withdrew it a day or two later."²⁶

Millis also notes, it was not until January 1938 that Roosevelt issued a serious call for rearmament, and in terms that could describe events today:

Armaments increase today at an unprecedented and alarming rate. It is an ominous fact that at least one-fourth of the world's population is involved in merciless devastating conflict....Armies are fighting in the Far East and in Europe; thousands of civilians are being driven from their homes and bombed from the air....Our national defense is inadequate for the purposes of national security and requires increase.²⁷

The warning was ominous, but as Millis concluded, "the requested action was minuscule." It should be instructive that in spite of the insistence of his military chiefs, in spite of all the warning indicators available, and in spite of sharp urging by allies, Roosevelt could not move decisively before December 7, 1941.

There are, it must be granted, a host of other reasons which could delay a presidential mobilization decision. For example, a potential adversary could easily construe a decision, by the U.S., to mobilize as a demonstration of an ultimate intent to wage war. This perception could foreseeably trigger a preemptive strike and could not be ignored or treated lightly.²⁸ A potential adversary who possesses weapons of mass destruction, together with the delivery means and the will to use them, presents dangerous possibilities which a president could find difficult to resist.

Alternatively, at the lower end of the spectrum of possibilities, the president is invariably forced to confront the issue of possible foreign retribution exacted against U.S. or allied citizens who live, work or vacation abroad. In the final analysis, however, without the prospect of gaining sufficient popular or Congressional support the president may not have the inclination to act in the first place. One must conclude, therefore, reconstitution decisions are more likely to be late than early, as the promise of a president's ability to act early is more myth than reality.²⁹

A contentious Congress: There is a great tendency to accuse or blame Congress for intruding and micro-managing, but, the fact is, Congress cannot and should not be excluded from the process. Constitutionally, given the general power of the purse, as well as the specific powers to raise an Army, maintain the Navy, and declare war, the body remains a necessary, legal and rightful player in the process. Previous discussion has already spoken to the necessity, by design, of reconciling the nation's many competing interests through debate and compromise, but the essential point remains, while the President may get his way over the long haul, the process takes time. Congress will, and must, authorize and appropriate the resources for any reconstitution effort, and, as such, early decisive actions, years in advance of an anticipated conflict, are not likely.

Forth, national will and decision making: As noted earlier, the national will is a vital aspect of both the nation's ability

to prepare for, as well as to wage, war. A potential center of gravity for the U.S., it typically takes either a direct personal threat or solid leadership to mold this national facet. As a matter of history, the nation has been reluctant to heed warnings that did not promise to impact both directly and immediately on the home-front. As George Kennan suggested many years ago, when Americans finally do act it is often in anger and with little thought as to long term implications, often creating much more havoc than is necessary:

But I sometimes wonder whether in this respect a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath--in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.³⁰

Americans have a tendency to wait until they have no choice about whether to wage war or not. Rather than proceeding to use force as a tool of policy, it is more often used in frustration, at the wrong time, for the wrong reasons and to the wrong ends.

A large part of the reason for this is there remains a strong American tradition of isolationism. With the end of the cold war, public sentiment appears to be drifting in such directions once again if the results of the recent presidential campaign are an accurate reflection of popular concerns. With a looming deficit and a perception of serious domestic economic problems, the 1992 campaign rhetoric quickly turned from international triumphs to domestic disgruntlement. It is

predictable then, in the absence of a clear direct assault on either the American pocketbook or American sovereignty, it will take strong leadership to move the people and, ultimately, Congress to spend the dollars and political capital necessary to reconstitute. The politics of the budget process invariably reinforces this attitude.³¹

Finally, it is not simply the American popular will which is important. Rather, it is a matter of sincere interest to act in concert or at least have the moral support of other nations. Coalition requirements play an important role today and may arise for several reasons, not the least of which may be a need for economic if not military reinforcement. In this regard the power of international public opinion may be crucial towards gaining the support required of foreign governments, even if such support is only overflight or basing privileges. The National Security Strategy recognizes this need by insisting that acting in concert with others must remain the order of the new era, and particularly emphasizes the use of the United Nations as was originally envisioned.³² The creation, modification or sustainment of such cooperative efforts, however, may well act to further delay decisive mobilization decisions.

The democratic process - conclusions: The conclusions one might draw from the foregoing seem rather straightforward. Unless someone can produce clear and convincing evidence that the political structure of the nation has somehow changed dramatically, or is likely to, it is predictable that this

country will not be able to mobilize in advance of future major conflicts. This will be particularly true if opponents are able to 'fuzz' perceptions with regard to their intent. The political process is simply not adept at making difficult or contentious decisions quickly. As a consequence, America and its defense planners should not hinge national defense plans on such assumptions.

The Defense Industrial Base--An Assessment:

The final contention, regarding the realities of reconstitution, centers on the amount of time it takes to produce modernized weapons of war. Even in the best of situations, long leads are an inherent aspect of the manufacturing process for complex high tech equipment, and while early warning and decisive political action would help enormously, neither can totally alleviate the problem. Unfortunately, as the defense base restructures and shrinks the leadtimes required for production are generally increasing, with the likely probability that some vital capabilities will disappear altogether.

An analysis of current trends, together with future prospects, indicates several major weaknesses which will preclude timely manufacturing efforts. The problems start with difficulties in just defining what future materiel and, therefore, base requirements should be. Combining this uncertainty with a historical inability to clearly determine existing capabilities further complicates the picture, making it difficult to figure out where to best focus current resources.

Resourcing constraints on scientific exploration, research and development, together with declining markets, and dwindling profitability margins are but a few of the factors complicating the situation. Adding high facilities upkeep and refurbishment costs, subcontractor survival difficulties, and conflicting goals--private investors versus government--challenged by foreign competitors and the problems seem insurmountable.

Differing policy approaches may help somewhat and will be discussed. Ultimately, however, it remains highly improbable that Twenty-first Century America will be able to rapidly gear up to meet modernized equipment production goals--whatever they may be--in the time frames required.

The decline of the industrial base, a chronic problem through the 1980s, has worsened precipitously. By 1997, the Joint Chiefs estimate, it might take four years to restore production capability to the 1990 level, which in itself was a discouraging benchmark. The problem is not solely one of sources of supply. The technological superiority of the U.S. armed forces is also at risk.³³

The above, July 1991, quote by John T. Correll, Editor in Chief of the Air Force Magazine, made reference to a Military Net Assessment, sent to Congress in March, which commented, "...reconstitution may well prove to be the linchpin of America's long term security." As Correll concluded, however:

Reconstitution may also prove to be a hole in the strategy, as it depends in large part on a defense industrial base that may not be there when the time comes.³⁴

In reviewing the status of industry two years later, it becomes apparent the problem is only becoming worse. With many more billions of dollars, much more than previously anticipated,

either already cut or likely to be cut from the defense budget the process of protecting the base is probably well beyond the reach of the defense department. Just as certain is the prospect that stemming the rupture of vital capabilities is largely beyond the control of anyone else at present, as well. Again, however, one must start with a definition if any notion of the issues at hand are to be taken in context.

Definition and Scope: The National Security Strategy defines the industrial base as:

...a complicated network of contracting, and vendor firms... [including] Defense Department maintenance depots....rely upon...for cost efficient manufacture, maintenance, and modernization of technologically superior weapon systems and munitions...in peacetime...and for the timely delivery of the goods and services required...in times of crisis or conflict.³⁵

Relating the integration of technology and production, the 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) further identifies and relates the two capabilities which remain key to future U.S. acquisition efforts. First, the maintenance of U.S. technological superiority, through the sustainment a viable technology base, remains a fundamental principle of the current national security strategy. The "technology base includes the institutions, information, physical infrastructure, skilled personnel, and the knowledge to use them in combination to develop and manufacture weapon systems."³⁶ Second, the JMNA notes, "the U.S. industrial base underlies our ability to produce the necessary weapon systems and supplies that make our strategy viable."³⁷

As these definitions suggest, there is an important and direct linkage between research, development and production. The implications of this linkage are important because reduced defense modernization efforts--shelving technology--must adversely impact on technological advancement, in spite of promises to the contrary. The relationships between R&D and dwindling defense acquisitions, hence declining corporate profits, are often overlooked, hidden in private balance sheets. Unable to recapture their initial investments via future sales, a reduction of private defense related research and development only follows, however. To prevent this, some form of incentive program will be required, either direct government funding to sponsor and encourage initial and applied research, or government will have to carry out most defense related research itself. The problem is, both options are unaffordable; progress will suffer.

A Complex Problem--Alternative Policy Approaches: While there may be other definitions which refine the base concept in more detail, the above provides a suitable startpoint.³⁸ What should become immediately apparent, however, is the aspect that the so-called 'defense industrial base' is really a misnomer. Quite simply, there is no defense industry per se. Rather, the defense department and the services purchase their equipment and supplies from a multitude of different industries. While some limited capabilities may be government owned, most are held privately by a broad combination of domestic as well as foreign investors.

Contrary to popular belief also, the base is not constrained or regulated by any comprehensive set of government or industry guidelines. Instead, as some suggest, it drifts--more or less in open competition--with only its constituent parts variously affected by a broad array of rules, regulations or laws. For example, while advanced technology remains a central principle of U.S. strategy, the base does not inherently "include a capacity for furtherance of the most advanced technologies."³⁹ As a consequence, the U.S. currently leads in only two of the top ten key emerging technologies according to the Department of Commerce.⁴⁰ Part of this problem is the result of an inherent inability to ascertain current capabilities, let alone identify and track problems with an intent on how to best focus resources.

Dr. James Miskel notes, for example, that while there have been many studies of the defense industry over the years, "there is no single authoritative assessment of the capabilities of domestic defense industries."⁴¹ Part of the reason, for the lack of such information, is the tendency of DoD to focus on procurement as a primary consumer, and not as a producer. The effect is that without direct participation in production, and given the multitude of competing firms involved, no viable means of assessing the defense industrial capabilities of the nation have ever evolved.

This complication invariably leads to questions as to what an effective government policy or set of policies might entail? What would the objectives of such policies be, and how would

anyone assess if they are on track or not? The Deputy Secretary of Defense recently initiated work within the department and industry to identify critical requirements and defense research and production capabilities which should be considered for some sort of direct government protection. Unfortunately, these efforts may be too little, if not too late, in other than a very few areas, and are made ever more tenuous by continuing promises of deeper budget cuts.

In short, without a 'defense industrial base' per se, there is really only a pool of suppliers. And these suppliers will only last as long as there is a demand for their products and profits to be made thereon. This notion gets directly to the problem of what it will take to keep the private market sector available. For in the absence of profits, private firms must either fold or convert in ways that will probably ruin hopes for later reconstitution.

Up to this point in U.S. history, the problem of supply has largely been left to the devices of the private market with government nonintervention, open competition and, consequently, the urge to make a profit the primary drivers. Progress--enormous progress--was the result of such a market structure. In the face of declining defense purchases, however, the inevitable result must be a shrinkage, if not an outright loss, of suppliers. The process which has worked so well in the past, seems to be exactly the wrong approach for a future of limited resources.

An urge to cut the cost of equipment, and so reduce the profitability of defense business, would seem to cause the pool of defense manufacturers to shrink, so reducing competition....If market theory can really be applied to the supply of defense equipment, then there will be no market provision of defense products unless the defense market remains profitable.⁴²

If businesses are not profitable because of declining government purchases, they will predictably look elsewhere for other opportunities, and accordingly may be lost to defense forever. Reconstitution cannot help but be impacted.

An alternative approach to the free market might involve increased government intervention. In this situation the government would either buy the means of production itself, or would attempt to somehow regulate others. Unfortunately, the costs of maintaining a pool of suppliers, during a time of shrinking defense budgets, may be prohibitively expensive over the long run. Even if affordable, and after spending billions of dollars shorn from other efforts, this alternative might still amount to nothing because of the changes which invariably take place over time: changes in the strategic environment, technological changes, etc. The government may be left on mobilization day with nothing to show for its vast investments but obsolete production designs, facilities and equipment.

Additionally, it must be noted that outright government intervention or ownership, together with the reduced competition which would predictably follow, is often a formula for disaster, as the Soviets can well attest. Institutions, especially governmental institutions, who lack a profit motive tend to

protect only the status quo, are much less open to new ideas and, consequently, preclude progress. To suggest, therefore, that it is possible to control a maze of interrelated yet competing firms, with mutually exclusive, conflicting, or divergent goals, processes and resources seems unrealistic. The problem is too broad and too complex, and presents too many other complications.

Defense Budget Trends--The Downward Spiral: The present difficulty, of course, almost goes without saying; lacking a prime threat and faced with perceived domestic economic problems the defense budget is rapidly shrinking. As a consequence defense contractors are currently in a serious struggle for sheer survival; whether talking aerospace, ship building, combat vehicle construction, or missile programs.

The 1992 JMNA notes, "measured either in terms of GNP or as a portion of Federal Spending, by the mid-1990's, the Defense budget will be at its lowest level in over 50 years."⁴³ The Bush Administration's 1993 Defense Budget, showed outlays dropping in 1997 to \$207 billion dollars, a loss of over \$23 billion dollars from 1983 which was not the high water mark of the 1980s (1987 adjusted). Compared to the peak year of 1989, the 1997 estimate represents a 27 percent decline.⁴⁴ Further, since this budget was submitted in February 1992, even more extraordinary cuts have been announced driving the numbers even lower.

The budget implications for reconstitution are serious, as the acquisition accounts have done even worse than the overall defense budget by picking up a disproportionate share of the

hits. Defense procurement, for example, will slip more than 55 percent during the 12 year period, 1985 to 1997, falling from \$100.04 billion to some point, predictably, well below the \$45.19 billion originally estimated for 1997. The research and development accounts have held somewhat steadier but are, nevertheless, slipping as well, down 28 percent from 1987 to 1997. These R&D cuts, however, only show direct government outlays. With additional reductions being levied to private developmental efforts as a result of reduced sales projections, one must expect a significant amount of the actual R&D cuts to remain hidden. Again, it is important to emphasize that additional and substantial cuts have been levied since the budget was submitted, while political pressures continue to persist in efforts to drive defense even lower.⁴⁵ The negative impacts on U.S. reconstitution capabilities are enormous, and the risks to the nation are rising commensurately.

Over 100 weapons programs were targeted by the outgoing administration for termination, including: Apache Helicopter, M1 Tank, Trident Submarine, F14D Fighter, F15 Fighter, F16 Aircraft, the Navy Advanced Tactical Fighter, A-12 Aircraft and Airforce Advanced Aircraft, and the Peacekeeper Missile. Some of these cuts were inevitable, especially in the face of the dwindling Soviet threat. Even if the Soviets had survived, the cycle would have trended down some, primarily because many of the heavy investments of the last decade have largely run their course. The current cuts, however, go well beyond what has been

experienced in the past or expected of the future. The consequent scramble by defense industries to downsize and diversify is already well underway as procurement is halted or held below minimum sustaining levels. The ultimate problem is that no one really knows where it's all going or where it will end up. Many firms have either already left or are likely to be forced out if they do not leave on their own.

Senator Barry Goldwater noted back in 1981, "[we] simply don't have the (industrial) capability any longer to surge military production the way we did in World War II."⁴⁶ Tomlinson, in 1986, arrived at the same conclusions, if not worse, based both on Defense Science Board and General Accounting Office Studies, amongst others.⁴⁷

One might conclude, therefore, if at the height of the Reagan defense buildup U.S. base capabilities were exhibiting some critical weaknesses which were never fixed, then timely reconstitution in the next decade is highly speculative, at best. By extension, where the base capabilities have continued to erode or have become decidedly worse with current cuts, reconstitution's problems may be insoluble. Again, time is the critical issue; America will surely not lose all of its ingenuity and abilities to produce. What is important, however, is its ability to produce in the time frames promised by reconstitution.

The resulting contraction in the supplier base, coupled with the likelihood of longer production leadtimes, may reduce our future ability to expand production rapidly....concern involves our lack of data and understanding of the industrial base...particularly the lower tier suppliers.⁴⁸

There are, of course, other problems which bear discussion as they will influence long term rearmament capabilities and future security prospects.

Other Trends and Future Prospects: With regard to present and future U.S. capabilities, a number of representatives from government, academia, and several major defense firms met recently to review current reconstitution problems and options. The group concluded that though there might be some room for debate on what could be done to correct the situation, times are tough and likely to get even tougher for defense suppliers. Several comments and concerns are of interest as they provide other insights on some of the issues facing the nation. To begin with, problems defining the intent of the national strategy and U.S. capabilities became evident, yet again.

For example, one analyst noted that there was an important distinction to be drawn between the concepts of reconstitution and mobilization, in that the former implied the US would have ample time to analyze and counter an emergency.⁴⁹ This distinction, while seemingly important at first glance, is probably irrelevant. Later discussions revealed substantial doubts on the part of many experts as to whether enough time could ever be made available to reconstitute, given the way some contractors are currently configured. Unemployment has skyrocketed as vast numbers of defense related employees are released from their jobs, including many who have special skills or expertise. Foreign integration, subcontractor failures, and

fierce competition for advanced production technologies, as well as the previously noted lack of incentives to maintain current plant and equipment all combine to present tough expensive problems. In the end, it seems immaterial to attempt to distinguish, therefore, between the two terms--reconstitution or mobilization. In spite of the best intentions, reconstitution can occur no sooner than mobilization, simply because it involves all of the same processes.

Overhead and Upkeep: In the case of McDonnell Douglas, a knowledgeable skeptic raised the question as to how, in the future, the millions of dollars which the company spends annually on plant and equipment upkeep and labor force training, and which is currently spread over four programs targeted for termination, are going to be covered?⁵⁰ The company clearly will not absorb these costs on its own, nor, it must be admitted, is the government likely to. Yet, without continued facility maintenance or workforce replenishment and training update programs, it is difficult to see how many production lines could ever be restarted in a timely or economical fashion, especially, after years of disuse. Leadtime must increase significantly.

Force Modernization: Force modernization policy decisions will invariably be the primary drivers as to how much of the base is likely to be kept active or current. With the budget cutbacks described earlier, it is increasingly unreasonable to assume, however, that even these scarce resources will cover more than the bare necessities of current production.

For example, current DoD policy intends to see new weapon's developments through only to initial proof of production and little more. The end item, together with its production technologies and manufacturing processes, will be shelved until needed. One of the dilemmas of this approach, however, is it competes for scarce resources with the implementation or sustainment of current equipment technological insertion programs. If the modification of current systems is already difficult to afford, then suggesting a diversion of scarce resources to base maintenance, without the possibility of continued production, can only reduce future production possibilities even further. Simply put, a problem exists wherein private industry is unlikely to do more without more government help, while defense cannot afford to provide the amount of help necessary.

These difficulties add up to a high likelihood that future plans for major items will not be simply pulled off the shelf, dusted off, put into production, and fielded in time to organize, train, and deploy new forces--all in advance of conflict--as promised. The net effect will be to leave the nation with only the forces and the equipment that is already on hand. But, in the face of continued budget constraints, and with a further diversion of scarce resources to other efforts which may be only marginally effective at best, risks of force obsolescence will rise as well. Equipment could easily be a generation or more out of date by the time America turns the corner on the next decade,

especially considering that most of the fielded technology today was developed in the 1970's and 80's.

Subcontractors: A Raetheon Company representative pointed out, even if prime contractors are able to survive by downsizing, divesting or streamlining, literally thousands of subcontractors are likely to disappear from the defense scene. Many of these lower tier suppliers do more than simply provide parts or services, as they are frequently repositories for special skills or other technical expertise which larger firms don't have. Once lost, it could take years to bring these firms back on line further adding to the time it would take to produce modern equipment.⁵¹

Production Lead Time: The question of production lead-times and associated problems is highlighted at McDonnell Douglas where, it was noted, it takes the firm six years to move a new product from 'prototyping to production.' Prototyping implies that most major end item research, development and production design work and methodologies have been accomplished, resulting in equipment ready for operational tests and evaluations. If, on the other hand, development has not proceeded this far, if the item is still in the concept exploration stage, for instance, then even more time will be required before fielding can take place. At McDonnell Douglas the entire process, from concept exploration to production, typically takes 15 to 20 years.⁵² In the midst of a crisis this process could inevitably be accelerated, but only to a certain point.

Eventually, no amount of money can speed production up if facilities are not available, if workforces or design teams have to be assembled, or if raw materials must be acquired. Invariably, a crisis will find any number of items at some stage of development short of production. Even intending, as the Graduated Mobilization Response doctrine currently does, to have all of the prior planning and negotiating done in advance cannot resolve all timing difficulties; the formula is too optimistic and not well grounded in the complexity of the issues at hand.

Competing Goals: Finally, it is important to recognize the problematic differences between diplomatic policy, national security goals and the goals of the private marketplace. Shareholder interests, and not public policy, are the primary forces driving defense industries, and, as such, policy planning must recognize the probability of divergent objectives. This is particularly important for the future of reconstitution.

As American companies restructure themselves, reconstitution will not be a primary motivator in the boardrooms--unless it has profit potential. Corporations, and their chief executives, cannot be expected to hang on to losing or even marginally profitable subsidiaries. A prime illustration was pointed out to the Strategic Outreach Conference last year by Byron Callan of Prudential Securities. In examining senior leadership behavior at General Dynamics (GD) Callan observed, "in 1991, these managers adopted an incentive program in which they would be awarded substantial bonuses based on stock performance."⁵³ This

was interpreted as a strategy of,

"liquidation," in which valuable assets have been sold and spending--including research and development spending--has been slashed. The result is that the company is sitting on a pool of cash, a portion of which will be returned to the shareholders in the form of a special dividend. (On June 9, 1992, General Dynamics announced it would purchase 30% of its stock in a "Dutch Auction").³⁴

Such a gain for shareholder's is a loss to the country. There has been much discussion, in the financial and business press, of the tactics companies ought to pursue as they look forward to the future. Recommendations invariably take on the goals of survival, growth, and profitability--not reconstitution. Marginal accounts are recommended for either immediate divestment or closure, while cash rich operations with limited future possibilities may be simply held and 'milked', as in the above example, for their cash value prior to disposal. In the end, timely reconstitution of defense capabilities will be difficult and more problematical than ever, once these assets are lost. The problem, unfortunately, is larger than the nation is able or willing to expend resources on, in order to treat.

Summary - Part I

In summary, there are several serious fallacies which should cause defense planners to doubt the long term viability of reconstitution. So much so, that it is difficult to see why America should depend on the concept as a central pillar of its national security strategy.

First, the key assumption regarding the availability of sufficient preparation time has no credibility. The U.S. has

never been able to make good on this promise with any degree of consistency. Nor has anything changed which might justify a belief that the future will be different. Intelligence, especially collection and analysis, is not the major issue. Rather, presidential willingness to act on intelligence has been notoriously slow when faced with major international crises, and for many compelling reasons.

Even when presidents were willing to act forcefully, however, the Constitutional process doesn't often facilitate their desires. The powers of government--including elected individuals--are too fractured to be either efficient or effective in the way reconstitution promises. Early warning is a problem which is not likely to be resolved and raises serious risks regarding the time the nation is ultimately going to have--or not have--to prepare for war; deterrence and defense hangs in the balance.

Second, while it is certain that America will retain some sort of production base capability in the future, it is extremely unlikely to be either responsive or sufficient in the way envisioned. If an assembly line is not already up and running it could easily take years to make it so. The process of converting civilian production to defense purposes, which has been offered as an alternative, could easily take years as well, given the exotic nature of most modern weapon's platforms. All of this assumes, too, that funds are available or that the concerned businesses are domestically controlled. Trying to influence a

foreign dominated corporation could prove difficult. To generally suggest, then, that both production and equipment technologies can be developed and shelved, or converted and then brought back in time is to deny the inordinate complexity and costs, including opportunity costs, of the entire situation.

The bottom line, is that the risk is high and rising that the next threat will catch the country unprepared or unable to immediately compete with the prevailing technologies. Where less than survival interests are involved, America risks losing the ability to either influence or protect its own vital interests.

PART II: WHAT TO DO

The groundwork must be laid for future security solutions now, not later. America has already cut, and continues cutting, substantial forces irrespective of their potential for reconstitution. Current resources must be invested with a frugal eye towards a future of limited rearmament options.

Recommendations follow and are broken into two parts; first, assumptions are proffered which might provide a start-point for further actions. Second, some recommended actions are offered for consideration.

Assumptions:

National Security Strategy: It seems reasonable to assume that the primary security objective of the United States will remain much as articulated by the outgoing Bush administration in January 1993:

Foremost, the United States must ensure its security as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values, institutions, and people. This is a sovereign responsibility which we will not abdicate to any other nation or collective organization.⁵⁵

This assumption is important because it provides an initial aim-point on which to focus the ultimate ways and means of security. Without coincidental focus on long term threats and vital interests, however, there can be no assurance that chosen policy options will be either effective or efficient--squandering scarce resources.

An Isolationist America: Although it appears that America

is once again turning inward, defense planners must continue to assume and plan for international involvement. With the increasing tendency of nation-states to fragment, often violently, under the pressures of the times, the U.S. should not confine itself to the homeland. The cold war may be over, but America's business abroad is nowhere near complete.

In the absence of a larger vision articulated by the new president, Congress and the Defense Department must assume one--a vision that speaks to America's international roles and responsibilities. This is vital to ensure both unity of effort and relevance in defense policies, programs and priorities.

A Global Threat: Next, it seems wise to continue to assume, even now, the eventual rise of a global threat, an opponent who might possess a sufficiently credible capability to at least threaten U.S. global interests, if not the very survival of the United States.

Nuclear superiority will likely provide no more assurance of dominance than it has in the past, and, unless U.S. leaders desire to go nuclear immediately, a credible and lethal conventional capability of some sort will still be required.

The country should not become so arrogant as to believe it can maintain dominance in military power, or in technological, economic, social, informational, or any other form of power, by expending only minimal efforts. To do so is likely to prove a fatal miscalculation. The world has watched Russia, Japan and Germany, amongst others, rise to challenge the U.S. economically

and technically over the past fifty years. One cannot begin to predict the challenges the nation may face in another few years; one should assume, however, there will be other contenders for America's position.

Military Force: While there are certainly other tools of power which the nation can wield in dealing with the world at large, an assumption that military power will remain critical to issues of national survival seems basic. Yet, there are some today who would argue otherwise, and, as a consequence, defense planners should not take this assumption for granted.

Radical nation-states continue to resort to the use of force to get their way when other means appear unavailable. Contrary to earlier notions of a new and more peaceful era, the phenomena of armed aggression is actually increasing rather than decreasing. As a consequence the United States must retain the ability to use force where its vital interests are threatened--selectively, judiciously, and effectively.

Economic and political power have proven ineffective when military force capabilities and national will were either lacking or were not credible. The United States cannot stand by helpless, as did Japan and Germany when Iraq threatened their vital petroleum supplies in August 1990. At that point two countries, who many contend are supplanting the U.S. as a superpower, appeared to be rather helpless, either unable or unwilling to act on behalf of their own vital interests. Military power--both the capability and the will--it must be

assumed, will remain relevant to the United States for as far into the future as one cares to peer.

Near Term Conventional Capabilities: If well executed and sustained, most of the elements of the current national security strategy--strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence and crisis response--should see the U.S. through the remainder of this decade and well into the next. This assumption depends on the continued maintenance of a modestly sized high quality force--trained and ready. It also depends on the continued lack of clear conventional challengers to American supremacy or interests above the regional level.

Continued force cuts, however, below the base force level advocated by General Powell, will start impacting negatively, over time, on the readiness of remaining forces. This will become especially true if the smaller defense forces continue to be confronted with a trend towards more frequent deployments, whether brush-fires or other-than-war type situations, i.e. Bosnia and Somalia respectively. There are two primary reasons for this:

First, there are a limited number of training days in any given year. The likely missions range from the low intensity humanitarian assistance variety to peace enforcement, peace keeping and, at the high end of the spectrum, general war--possibly involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. Each mission is different, and may require radically different attitudes--if not skills--and, consequently, different types of

preparation. A unit operating consistently at the low end of the spectrum may require a substantial amount of time to retrain for a higher intensity--faster paced--scenario, where larger forces, vaster distances, and quicker actions/reactions may be involved.

Second, current equipment readiness rates will start to sag by the end of this decade, given an aging fleet and extended operations in hostile--i.e. desert--environments unless significant resources continue to be allocated to maintenance and equipment rebuild programs. Even a low intensity humanitarian assistance mission consumes resources and puts significant wear and tear on people and machinery. The current U.S. modernization advantage can be quickly dissipated and lost if overused and not replenished because of budgetary constraints. Assumptions regarding force readiness must be closely monitored and realistically updated as actual readiness levels can change dramatically in very short periods of time.

Surge Capabilities: Given current American production capabilities, it seems reasonable to assume that the nation has both the near and mid-term surge capacity to meet most regional conflicts. Production may be increased or brought back on line by tickling a still fairly warm production base with more money. Recent Desert Storm surge experiences demonstrate the viability of this approach in many areas.

Additionally, some more immediate replenishment capabilities may be realized, on a short term basis, by mobilizing reserves or drawing off other equipment either in the maintenance system, in

storage or at prepositioned sites, or uncovered as the services downsize. Also, one should still be able to count on the technological superiority bought largely with the investments of the past two decades, again assuming the resulting materiel is not used up without replenishment.

Next, there are still a fair number of people in the national population who remain young enough, fit enough, and who, with recent military experience, could be called back to duty.

This human resource capability, however, will start eroding quickly. Aging the experienced portion of the population just ten years has significant implications, for instance. Young people getting out of the services today after one enlistment are perhaps twenty-two years old. In ten years they will be that much older, and most likely will be married with young families of their own. They are less likely to be in shape physically and their retention of any militarily useful skills by that point must be dubious at best.

At some stage, then, the capability to surge either production or manpower for a major conflict will diminish considerably. Manpower, even if available, will require time for training and development, especially as experienced leaders, skilled people--soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines--and trained units are not manufactured overnight. Additionally, without continual modernization, the current U.S. edge can only diminish as the rate of competing technological changes continues to proliferate. Considering the probable lack of

sufficient preparation time, it becomes apparent that shelving new technology will be akin to not modernizing at all.

Early Warning: Assume no early warning; given earlier conclusions, response time will be a vulnerable center of gravity for the United States. Planners cannot dismiss this vulnerability, but must, instead, take positive steps to cope with it. Supporting or branch contingency plans may be laid to capitalize on early warning if it materializes, but time must not become the 'long pole' in the tent--the pole which, if it doesn't hold, will bring the tent down around the nation's ears, smack in the middle of a storm.

The strategy behind the structure of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), provides a model for thought in this regard. Short of strategic depth and assuming a lack of early warning time, the Israelis have configured their forces accordingly. They do not depend on major reconstitution efforts as the United States' strategy calls for. Their total force relies primarily on a mixture of active components and quickly deployable reserves.

Priority for resourcing and effort is given to intelligence activities first, then to air power (the two forces which do not depend upon immediate major reserve call-ups), followed by the main ground forces and the navy, which rely significantly on ready reserves.

This structure gives the IDF an immediate operational offensive capability, able to act with little or no warning and at relatively low cost when compared to the costs associated with

large standing forces. While priority is given to intelligence efforts to increase the chances of early warning and thereby reducing the risks associated with surprise, response plans do not hinge on it--certainly not to the extent of anticipating such warning years in advance. The United States obviously has other needs, interests and priorities, but it should expect no more time and must posture itself accordingly.

Further Base Force Cuts? This is a near term action with long term consequences. The preceding assumption regarding the lack of early warning implies that additional cuts below the base force level, may be completely unwarranted at present. This seems especially true in the absence of significant organizational or equipment changes, and as the international scene remains in turmoil. Two assumptions are important here and are based on the notion that reconstitution will not happen in time.

First, policy planners should operate on the premise that what the nation now cuts will not be restored at least until after a conflict breaks out--when it may be too late. Lacking the muscle to back up its diplomatic initiatives, America risks losing influence and suffering irreparable harm to its credibility; deterrence, without credibility, is a dream.

Second, policy planners ought to assume that the currently confused international state of affairs will continue for some time. The world is clearly in transition and to what ends or how long it will take are impossible to decipher at present. The

turmoil could last for generations given the nature of the problems and the consequent difficulties in arriving at acceptable solutions. The sources of conflict are innumerable, overlapping and complex, and, as a result, even where one grievance may be settled several more may pop up to take its place.

The implication, of both assumptions, is the United States should not continue to unilaterally hack away at its own security forces while searching for an elusive peace dividend. A longer view of the world and U.S. objectives is required.

Unilateral Action: Finally, it should be assumed that the U.S. may have to act unilaterally in defense of its vital national interests. While not a desirable option, and as much as one might wish otherwise, the country cannot base its well-being upon transient alliances with other nations. The sovereign interests of others can change substantially at any time and with little warning.

Of course, acting alone means possessing the capability to act credibly without dependence on others. As noted above, diplomatic words mean very little without the means to back them up. Capabilities must be preserved if this is to remain possible.

Recommended Actions:

First: The reconstitution element of the national security strategy should either be abandoned or seriously modified. It should not serve as a linchpin to the nation's primary

warfighting capabilities. The predictable lack of warning time, coupled with a dwindling production base, virtually guarantees success to an opponent who has the resources and the inclination to operate inside the U.S. decision production cycle.

Second: Given the above, defense planners need to frame a future security and warfighting strategy in terms of what can be realistically assumed and afforded; expect no increase in the amount of resources available to do this, of course.

With regard to research, development and acquisition capabilities, there are serious defense initiatives currently in process, lead by the previous Deputy Secretary of Defense. The intent was to identify critical acquisition problems and develop potential solutions. These efforts need to be sustained and, in fact, extended and integrated with reviews of the entire national defense structure--not just equipment. New thinking and solutions are vital, but such solutions must have a long range focus and should not deny, or delay for more than a moment, recognition of the fact that reconstitution is unrealistic as presently framed.

Third: Defense planners must be careful that they have not, or do not, become their own worst enemies. Accepting that a rearmament strategy has a place in defense planning, care must be exercised to ensure that overly optimistic assessments--i.e. often done when advocating or justifying programs to the public--do not encourage deeper structure and acquisition cuts than are currently warranted. This is a primary problem with the current

reconstitution notion--it simply promises more than it will ever be able to deliver. In the absence of serious challenges, it is taken for granted and used as a justification for broader deeper defense cuts than are wise.

Forth: Without a significant ability to reconstitute, in advance of the first battle, it is essential that the remaining 'total force' be high quality. To do this within the expected fiscal constraints will be difficult. To do it as the services are currently configured, per the current roles and missions, may be impossible. Old traditions may have to be set aside for the good of the nation.

There is already much grist for critic's complaints regarding service redundancies and duplication. Further cuts seem likely to both structure and modernization, and quality must inevitably suffer. The services should take the lead on these efforts and not wait to have them foisted up from some other source. But the services are right in their crucial insistence that reforms should not be driven strictly by fiscal pressures or other short term domestic concerns; change for change's sake is not an answer.

Fifth: There are many critics, inside government and out, who expect instant answers to all problems now. Many of the pressures on the defense department to realign service roles and missions are driven purely by ideological or budgetary motives. National requirements cannot be gleaned from the number of dollars one has to spend. Rather a realistic look at the world,

a vision of America's roles and responsibilities in that world, U.S. interests, and the intensity or dangers inherent to those interests must be taken under advisement. Only then can realistic and reasonable priorities be established, and the nation's future, in a world of chaos, assured.

As such, Americans should be reluctant to accept instant answers from anyone, and skeptical of those who promise complete solutions now. The problems are too complex, too dynamic. The immediate future of the United States, and that of the world at large, is likely to remain in transition for generations.

Sixth: competition must remain the American way of doing business. The security stakes associated with fostering economic competition are vital to the nation's long term health and general well-being. It is hard to ignore the evidence that competition made this country what it is today, made its developed trading partners--East and West--what they are today, and ensured victory over the economically uncompetitive Soviet Communist state.

This point requires emphasis here because there are simply too many calls today which would have the effect of reducing competition between suppliers, whether foreign or not: trade protectionism, local job protectionism, 'buy American', are only part of the difficulties. Many such calls originate in the defense industries and includes both those who demand more governmental interventionism as well as those who advocate less. Too often these views represent only parochial or special

interests and conflict with other, possibly higher, national values and priorities. In the face of reduced defense spending, care must be taken to preserve competition and, therefore, one of America's significant advantages.

Over the long run, giving in to pressures to reduce competition seem the surest way of destroying the creativity, ingenuity, and productivity of this nation. If the tide of world economics is shifting some important industries to other nations, then resistance may equate to fighting the problem, delaying the inevitable, when other complimentary strategies might be more effective.

Seventh: Given that most near term threats will be regional and not global in nature, the United States has a relatively 'safe' window of opportunity to test new ideas. There is time to develop new warfighting organizations, doctrines and concepts before they are needed on a wider, global, battlefield.

To delay will be to lose the chance of a lifetime. Nor is the United States the only nation in a position to capitalize on this window of opportunity. There are others who may have even more of an incentive. America's recent victories reinforce the methods used and create a natural reluctance to tamper with a winning formula--the 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it' mentality. The risk is that next war may not be fought on the same basis as the last one and, consequently, old models may not be appropriate.

Conclusions

The thesis and direction of this discussion must seem rather negative--possessing a certain doomsday quality. Truly, that is not the intent. America has proven itself too diverse, too talented, too ingenious, and too successful in the past.

However, the nation should not bet its future success on old solutions. The United States will have neither the luxury of time to get ready, as it has in the past, nor lack global challengers. Policy makers should not plan on early warning, much less bet on decisive political action. Politically, the United States has never been able or willing to expend the resources necessary to prepare for war during times of peace. America's delayed entries into World War's I and II were not flukes of history, as the political and economic structure of the country makes it difficult, if not impossible, to do otherwise in the absence of a direct threat. Isolationism remains the historical norm, and, as a result, about all that can be guaranteed is a shortage of resources and a lack of early response.

As a consequence, current and future defense cuts, based on a false notion that the nation can rearm at will and in time, are patently misguided. This same false sense of security will inevitably impact on the quality of the remaining forces as well. The risks of another 'Task Force Smith' will increase dramatically if planning assessments remain jaded as to real

threats and real possibilities. Unfortunately, when the next global crisis occurs, and it will, there may be no time for back-up reinforcements, given technology and a continuously shrinking world; America will have to go with what it has and its forces must be ready.

Accordingly, planners must ensure that the foundations of the nation's strategies, especially regarding future industrial base capabilities, have their feet firmly planted in reality. Even now this base is fragmenting as thousands of contractors and subcontractors flee the defense market--if they don't fail first. Motivated by profit concerns, not government policy, those firms who survive--including primary contractors--will be rescaled, retooled and redirected towards other, nondefense related, growth opportunities. The defense department does not have the dollars, nor does the nation have the will, to stop this flight.

If tomorrow's security capabilities and the will to use them are founded only on hopes or on mythical notions of past deeds--abetted by short memories--there may be no future at all. Democracy is not to blame if the nation is unprepared. Rather the citizens of democracy must bear the burden, for surely they will pay the price if found wanting.

History does not forgive us our national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our domestic politics. If you say that mistakes of the past were unavoidable because of our domestic predilections and habits of thought, you are saying that what stopped us from being more effective than we were was democracy, as practiced in this country. And if that is true, let us recognize it and measure the full seriousness of it--and find something to do about it.⁵⁰

Endnotes

1. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993), ix.
2. George H. Bush, Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium, The Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado (Washington: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 2 August 1990)
3. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army: 1775-1945 (Washington, D.C., US Army Center of Military History, 1989), preface. Defined mobilization as: "...the assembling and organizing of troops, materiel, and equipment for active military service in time of war or other national emergency; it is the basic factor on which depends the successful prosecution of any war."
4. George H. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 29-30. "Beyond the crisis response capabilities provided by active and reserve forces, we must have the ability to generate wholly new forces should the need arise...The ability to reconstitute is what allows us safely and selectively to scale back and restructure our forces in-being...will require us to invest in hedging options whose future dividends may not always be measurable now. It will require careful attention to the vital elements of our military potential: the industrial base, science and technology, and manpower...The standard by which we should measure our efforts is the response time that our warning processes would provide us (author's italics) of a return to previous levels of confrontation in Europe or in the world at large...must be able to reconstitute a credible defense faster than any potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense."
5. Larry I. Bland, ed., George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991), 302.
6. H. A. DeWeerd, Selected Speeches and Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall: Chief of Staff United States Army (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945), 126. Chapters 27-29 contain text from the General's testimony before both the Senate and the House Committees on Military Affairs, actively recommending extensions of the previous year's Selective Service, Reserve Component, and enlistments, appointments and commissions, beyond one year. Politically there was a great deal of opposition to the extension and had the tide of organized public sentiment carried the day, the beginnings of the preparation of the Army for conflict, which had begun the previous year, would

have been undone--scarcely five months before Pearl Harbor.

7. Bland, 302-303.

8. Bush, National Security Strategy, 29-30.

9. Ibid., 29-30.

10. Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1956), 237.

11. Kreidberg, 695.

12. Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 322, 337. The shipbuilding program was not approved by Congress until 1916 and the aviation program proved especially disappointing:

"Announcing its intention to build 10,000 warplanes the government turned to the automobile industry which had a deserved reputation for mass production miracles....although the manufacturers eventually adopted Allied designs, aircraft production never met requirements, and Army aviators flew to glory in French and British aircraft."

13. Millis, 237. Goes on to note: "Toward the end of the war American-made machine guns began to meet the demand; but the artillery problem was solved by frankly adopting the French 75 (as well as their 155 howitzer) because the French could provide them in numbers and because they simplified the matter of ammunition supply. A great effort was made to produce airplanes in quantity, at the expense of the then enormous sum of about a billion dollars. It was an almost complete failure; even with the primitive designs of the period, a volume aircraft industry simply could not be set up in the time available."

The war had been going since 1914, yet by 1919, five years later, the time available was too short to produce aircraft in quantity. The bottom line is that, if early warning is not taken and used, then no amount of money can retrieve some shortcomings.

14. Millis, 274-275, 288.

15. Ibid., 288.

16. M. T. Tomlinson, Jr., Industrial Mobilization and the National Defense: How Ready Are We? (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1986), 3.

17. Jacques S. Gansler, The Defense Industry (Cambridge, MA: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1980), 9-11.

18. George L. Butler, "Adjusting to Post-Cold War Strategic Realities," Parameters 21 (Spring 1991): 7-8.
19. Walter Laquer, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 260.
20. Michael I. Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1989), 239.
21. Ibid., 241.
22. U.S. News and World Report Staff, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Random House, 1992), 41.
23. Laquer, 260. The greatest difficulties in political analysis usually concern the intentions of new regimes which have emerged as the result of radical internal change. These regimes raise the general question whether, and to what extent, predictions can be made about impending internal change by violent means. Such change has been far more frequent in the recent past than surprise attacks, and--in the absence of nuclear war--will be the central issue facing the West in the near future."
24. Handel, 232, 233. "The unexpected appearance of new weapons in massive quantities, and/or their use in an innovative way, can be of decisive importance...
Given the rate of technological change since the end of the Second World War and evidence from recent wars, there is little doubt that technological surprise and deception will play a much more critical role in future wars
...As technological developments made unprecedented contributions to the feasibility of strategic surprise, the warning time available to the intended victim decreased dramatically...The possibility that an unanticipated attack could quickly determine the outcome of an entire war thus became a very serious threat to the survival of states..."
25. Bland, 441.
26. Millis, 266.
27. Ibid., 267.
28. Handel, 230. Additionally, the greater an adversary perceives his own vulnerability to be or if, over time, he sees his own vulnerabilities to be increasing, then the more likely will be the inclinations for early preemptive attacks. "Clearly, then, the incentive to resort to strategic surprise (as well as to deception) is particularly strong for countries that are only too cognizant of their relative vulnerability."

29. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950, 3d ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 75-79. Part of the payoff of early action is the ability to not only deter, but possibly to head off larger conflicts. In this regard Kennan, looking back with the advantages of hindsight regarding the U.S. predilection for isolating itself, concludes the two world wars might have been avoided. Speaking directly to World War II: -

"As things stood in 1939, therefore, the Western democracies were already under the handicap of being militarily the weaker party. They could hardly have expected to avoid paying the price...In so far as we are talking about Germany, there are two such things that strike me as of obvious importance, and in both of them we Americans could, had we wished, have taken a considerable part. First, we could have tried to give greater understanding, support, and encouragement to the moderate forces in the Weimar Republic...if that did not succeed we then we could have taken a stiffer and more resolute attitude against Hitler's earlier encroachments and provocations...the Rhineland in 1936 would probably have yielded better results than firmness at the time of Munich."

30. Kennan, 66.

31. Kennan, Chpt 4-6. Covers the periods of World War I, II, and the early cold war years to 1950. Comments that America, with regard to its lack of participation in world affairs, its failure to recognize inherent U.S. interests and balance of power realities in Europe, and its consequent misguided war aims, must take significant blame. In gazing upon the rubble of the post war world he laments (p.56):

"When you tally up the total score of the two wars, in terms of their ostensible objective, you find that if there has been any gain at all, it is pretty hard to discern.

Does this not mean that something is terribly wrong here? Can it really be that all this bloodshed and sacrifice was just the price of sheer survival for the Western democracies in the twentieth century."

32. Bush, National Security Strategy, 13.

33. John T. Correll, "A Hole in the Strategy," Air Force Magazine (July 1991): 7.

34. Ibid., 7.

35. Bush, 15.

36. Colin L. Powell and The Joint Staff, 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment, (Washington: Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J8), 1992), 10-6.

37. Ibid., 10-8.

38. Ethan B. Kapstein Economics and National Security Program, Reconstitution: Force Structure and Industrial Strategy Strategic Outreach Conference Report (Cambridge, MA: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 1992), 1-2. The following definition was provided by DoD's Office of Strategic Competitiveness and was used by the Conference:

"... we will need a production base to produce new systems and a maintenance and repair base to support them. As we make procurement and investment decisions, we will have to place a value on the assured supply and timely delivery of defense materials in time of crisis. In the near term, we should retain and store equipment from units being deactivated. Over the longer term, must increase our capability to expand production or use alternative sources of supply. We need the capacity for industrial surge, and must plan for production from new or alternative capacity. We must reduce unneeded military specifications and ensure corporations continue to have incentives to engage in innovative defense work"

39. Marvin Leibstone, "The U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Can It Survive?" Military Technology (December 1991): 16.

40. Ibid.

41. James Miskel, "Domestic Industry and National Security," Strategic Review (Fall 1991): 29.

42. David Burns, "What Is The Defense Industrial Base?," Defense Analysis 8 (August 1992): 208.

43. Powell, 10-8.

44. Executive Office of the President, Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1993: Supplement, February 1992 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 5-68,69.

45. Ibid.

46. Barry Goldwater, "US Dependency on Foreign Sources for Critical Material," Vital Speeches of the Day 67 (15 June 1981): 519.

47. Tomlinson, 12-19.

48. Powell, 10-8, 10-11.

49. Kapstein, 1.

50. Ibid., 2.

51. Ibid., 3.

52. Ibid., 4.

53. Ibid, 3.

54. Ibid.

55. George H. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 3.

56. Kennan, 73.

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